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Institutions are important for proper economic performance, but are replaceable by trust or 
other social norms. We show that when proper institutions and trust are missing, integrity of 
the individuals can replace them. We construct a model of a transactions-based economy with 
contracts preceding the transactions, and show that any one of (1) institutions, (2) trust, or (3) 
integrity, foster economic growth. We construct data of economic performance of social 
groups in Lebanon, measure integrity and other values of these groups, and use this data and 
data from Kenya to support one of the model’s predictions. Policy implications are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
  Institutions minimize transaction costs by enabling effective enforcement of 
contracts (North 1990), and thereby enable growth and facilitate better economic 
performance (see, for example, Knack and Keefer 1995; Hall and Jones 1999). When 
formal contract-enforcing institutions do not function well, social norms, social 
conventions and informal rules, which lead to trust, can foster transactions and thus 
increase output and growth. Zak and Knack (2001) present a theory showing that trust 
lowers costs of investment, thereby increasing economic performance. They use data of 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization (assuming that fractionalized countries enjoy less trust) 
and specific questions regarding trust from the World Values Survey
1 to support 
empirical analysis (see also Knack and Keefer 1997; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2004). 
Greif (1993) presented other social norms and social arrangements that enable 
transactions.  
  However, institutions and trust, as well as other social norms, require participation 
of many agents in a specific social structure, which does not always occur. This paper 
presents a third alternative that can replace institutions and social norms such as trust in 
ensuring successful transactions and better economic performance - the integrity and 
honesty of the individual agent (integrity and honesty serve as synonyms hereinafter, 
with the interpretation of a tendency of an individual not to deceive). We show that 
certain kinds of (1) institutions, (2) social norms and (3) moral traits, the character of the 
individual agent, and specifically integrity, can substitute for one another. Therefore, 
underdeveloped countries in which integrity level is high stand a better chance to develop 
compared to other underdeveloped countries. In such cases, aid can be directed at 
infrastructure and education rather than at constructing better institutions. 
  The macroeconomic literature has explored very few values of individual agents, 
and most of the discussion has been very general (see Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 
2006, for a literature survey). Religion gained some attention in the literature (starting 
with the influential work of Max Weber), but since religion includes many values, it does 
not permit the isolation of the effect of any particular value. Risk avoidance has received 
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substantial attention in the microeconomic literature, but macroeconomic growth 
literature has widely ignored it by assuming risk-neutrality, or identical risk avoidance 
among all agents. As mentioned above, trust has received some attention, but as a social 
arrangement (social norm) rather than as an individual's value. Only lately the study of 
values in economics has accelerated. Gintis (2007) shows that the endowment effect, the 
notion that people place a higher value on objects they own than on objects that they do 
not own, can lead to respect for private property, therefore supports the importance of the 
individual's values to economic performance. Akerlof (2007) motivates the study of 
values by demonstrating a possible effect of behavioral norms on the macroeconomic 
outcome, but without any empirical methodology or relation to institutions. Huang (2008) 
addresses tolerance for uncertainty, Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz (2007), Tabellini 
(2005) and Tabellini (2008a) address cultural values, and Alesina and Giuliano (2007) 
analyze the effect of family values.  
  We construct a model of a transactions-based economy. Every period the agents 
in the economy are randomly matched into pairs and have the opportunity to bargain and 
reach an agreement. After the bargaining phase, they can follow the agreement, and 
engage their resources (such as capital) in a transaction, or breach the agreement, if one 
was reached. If both agents transact, they both enjoy an increase in their amount of 
resources, but this is not the case if one or both agents do not transact. We show that 
strong institutions, in terms of contract enforceability, enable transactions, by fostering 
reaching agreements and then adhering to them, and that trust can take the role of 
contract enforcing institutions in enabling transactions. Thus, many transactions occur, 
each increasing the amount of productive resources and therefore allowing for higher 
output and growth. These conclusions are in line with existing literature. We analyze an 
economy without contract enforcing institutions or trust, and show that integrity can 
replace the two. Specifically, an economy in which all agents are honest will perform the 
same as an economy with good institutions or a high level of trust, while in an economy 
with no institutions, trust or integrity, no transactions will occur. The model yields an 
interesting result in the case of a heterogeneous population of honest and dishonest 
agents. In this case, honest agents may be cheated by dishonest agents, and thus be worse 4  
 
off than the dishonest agents, even though a purely honest economy is better off than a 
dishonest economy. 
  A major contribution of the model is in analyzing evolution over time, especially 
in a heterogeneous economy. We analyze the evolution of the economy assuming that the 
payoffs of the transactions are the return to the capital invested in these transactions. We 
find that an economy in which all agents are honest grows over time, while an economy 
in which all agents are dishonest decays over time. As for heterogeneous economies with 
respect to values, we find that as long as the share of capital owned by honest agents is 
high enough, some transactions occur. However, since dishonest agents perform better 
than honest agents, the share of capital owned by honest agents decreases over time, and 
eventually transactions cease to occur, and then the economy exhibits negative growth.  
  Transaction based models have been used to analyze various markets (see, for 
example, Mortensen and Pissarides 1994; Wheaton 1990). Axelrod (1984) analyzed the 
evolution of cooperation using the prisoner's dilemma as the basic transaction (see also 
Axelrod 1997; Tabellini 2008b). The basic transaction in our model is similar, but we add 
upon it a phase of negotiating an agreement (bargaining) and an agreement preceding 
every transaction. Since most of the economic activity in the real world is accompanied 
by some kind of an agreement, explicit or implicit, among its participants, this phase 
makes the transaction and the entire model much more realistic. Moreover, it enables the 
analysis of institutions and trust, and the introduction of integrity into the payoffs of the 
transactions, thus enabling the analysis of integrity and various other values (see, for 
example, Rabin 1993, for introduction of fairness into the material payoffs of a 
transaction). We show that institutions, trust and integrity allow for cooperation without 
using history-dependent strategies or reputation, assuming that agents are not aware of 
the history. Unlike Tabellini (2008b), we do not rely on the distance between the matched 
agents, but solely on the current distribution of the types of agents and their capital. Our 
analysis of the evolution of the economy resembles evolutionary game theory (see, for 
example, Friedman 1998; Samuelson 2002). However, in addition to the differences 
mentioned above, we do not assume an increase in the number of agents of the type 
receiving a higher payoff, but rather an increase in their capital, while the number of 5  
 
agents from each type remains constant. Thus, we create a macroeconomic model that 
allows for the analysis of the effect of institutions, norms of trust, and integrity. 
  A major obstacle with embedding moral traits and other values into 
macroeconomic research is the difficulty in measuring values. This has severely limited 
the literature and contributed to an absence of data. The World Values Survey, 
administering questionnaires directly asking people about some values, did not address 
many of the values that potentially affect economic performance, and the examined 
values suffer from a measurement problem due to the hesitancy of interviewees to 
identify their own perceived negative values, and from a problem of endogeneity, i.e., the 
concern that values might be affected by economic performance (see Guiso et al. 2006, 
for a description of the problem).
2 This research follows the method used in Aharonovitz 
and Kabura (2008) in deducing values from children's stories, thus overcoming the 
above-mentioned problems (see also McClelland 1961). Stories are long known to reflect 
the values of the society (Johns-Heine and Gerth 1949; Albrecht 1956), and some claim 
that stories educate children and affect their values (Vitz 1990; Hakemulder 2000). 
Relying on these characteristics, this study uses stories collected through questionnaires 
to identify the values of various groups. The use of stories allows us to overcome the 
measurement problems in surveys of values mentioned above, and the fact that the stories 
chronologically precede present economic performance, i.e., the values deduced from the 
stories are unaffected by current economic conditions, solves the endogeneity problem.  
  However, since integrity is a 'third line of defense', following institutions and 
trust, empirical analysis requires either data regarding all three for a large set of countries 
or data regarding economic performance of several groups sharing the same 
malfunctioning institutions and low level of trust. Since we were unable to measure 
integrity in a large set of countries, we chose to focus on different religious groups in 
Lebanon. These groups share the same Lebanese institutions, which due to internal and 
external disputes are not well functioning, and have similar low levels of trust, but differ 
in their economic performance and integrity (see section 3 for data). We relied on the 
geographical segregation of the major religious groups in Lebanon to construct data 
                                                  
2 Hofstede (2001) focused on measuring and analyzing work related values, but suffered from similar 
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regarding the economic performance of each group. Surveys were administered to 
identify popular children's stories in each of the groups, from which several values, 
including integrity, were measured. We found heterogeneity of integrity across the 
groups, and a positive link between integrity and poor economic performance among 
these groups, thus supporting the result of the model regarding heterogeneous population. 
We use data regarding economic performance and values in Kenya from Aharonovitz and 
Kabura (2008) to further support this conclusion using regression analysis. Thus, we 
provide support for the conclusion of the model regarding a heterogeneous economy with 
respect to integrity, but we do not possess data that allows for testing the conclusions 
regarding pure-honest or pure-dishonest economy. We hope to be able to collect further 
data and to test these conclusions as well in the future. 
  The major contribution of this study is to provide a transaction-based model for 
the economy including agreements for transactions and capital, which enables analyzing 
the effect of contract enforcing institutions, social norms such as trust, and integrity on 
economic performance, introducing the effect of integrity on economic performance in 
the absence of contract enforcing institutions and trust, and allowing for the analysis of 
values. In addition, it demonstrates a procedure for measuring integrity, while 
characterizing economic performance and values of major religious groups in Lebanon.  
  The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a model of a transactions-based 
economy and analyzes the effect of integrity. Section 3 presents the data and empirical 
analysis. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. The  Model 
  Almost every economic activity involves transaction between two or more 
individuals: a supplier selling goods to a producer, a worker working for a firm, 
individuals investing in a firm, a seller and a buyer etc., and the output of the economy is 
the aggregation of these transactions. We start by defining a basic economic transaction 
which engages resources of two matched individuals. Every period many transactions (or 
attempted transactions) can take place, but every unit of a resource (such as capital) can 
engage, or attempt to engage, in only one of these transactions every period. The total 
resources available for the economy can increase or decrease over the period as a result 7  
 
of the transactions, and the new amount of resources will serve the economy in the next 
period. We start by defining the transaction and the possible agreement for transaction, 
and analyze the effect of institutions, trust, and integrity on its result, and proceed by 
aggregating over the transaction to analyze total output and growth. 
2.1  A Single Transaction 
  For simplicity, we assume that every transaction involves exactly two agents. The 
analysis will focus on a single resource – capital, but identical transactions can be 
introduced for labor (i.e., time) and other resources, where every transaction involves one 
unit of this resource from both sides. Before we get to the formal modeling, we will use 
two examples to illustrate it. Imagine, for example, a buyer and a seller matched for a 
transaction, in which the seller supplies a good to the buyer while the buyer pays the 
seller. They can both decide not to transact; in this case, there is no transaction, each 
retains its own resources (capital, goods, etc.) and their utility does not change. If they 
both decide to transact, the buyer pays for the good and enjoys the consumer's surplus, 
while the seller is paid and enjoys a certain profit. Hence, they both enjoy an increase in 
their utility. However, a third possibility is that the seller provided the good but doesn’t 
get paid, thus the buyer enjoys a higher utility than before, while the seller enjoys a lower 
one. A fourth option, which is symmetric to the third, is that the buyer pays for the good 
while the seller does not supply it. We regard the third and fourth cases as cases in which 
one agent cheats the other.
3  
  The second example is two agents who are matched for establishing a firm with 
an investment of one unit of capital each. Cooperation of both agents is required for the 
success of the firm. Thus, they can both invest in the firm and profit from the investment, 
or they can both abstain from investing and retain their initial capital. However, a third 
option is that one invests while the other does not. Since a successful transaction requires 
the participation of both investors, the one that invested may lose its capital. In this case, 
the second potential investor may require a significant premium to participate in the 
transaction and allow the first investor to retain its capital. Hence, we assume that the 
                                                  
3 While in Akerlof (1970) the seller can hide the quality of the good from the buyer, but the buyer cannot 
deceive the seller, here both agents can deceive one another.   8  
 
first investor ends up with less than what he invested, while the second ends up with 
more than what he could have received had they both transacted to begin with.  
  Following these examples, we define a potential transaction as a random match of 
two agents, in which every agent can engage one unit of the resource (capital), and decide 
whether to transact (T) or not (D). If both decide not to transact, they each end up with 1, 
the same unit they started with. If both decide to carry out the transaction, they each end 
up with r, where r>1, at the end of the period. If one carries out his part of the transaction 
while the other does not, the latter receives r+c (the gain to the 'cheating' agent) while the 
former receives a payoff of 1-c, c>0, which is lower than his initial capital. Note that the 
potential transaction is in fact a "prisoner's dilemma" type of interaction. We restrict the 
agents to pure strategies. See Figure I for the representation of the potential transaction as 
a strategic game: 
 
Figure I - A Potential Transaction 
  D T 
D  1 , 1  r+c , 1-c 
T  1-c , r+c  r , r 
 
  We deviate from the common transaction based models (see, for example, 
Axelrod, 1984) by introducing a phase of bargaining for an agreement prior to the 
attempted transaction itself, i.e., the matched individuals are allowed to talk, negotiate 
and reach an agreement (a contract) prior to the attempted occurrence of the transaction. 
Since most of the real world economic activity is accompanied by an agreement among 
its participants, this phase makes the model more realistic than many other transaction-
based models. Thus, the two individuals can agree on transacting, on non-transaction or 
on any pair of strategies (one for each agent) for the transaction itself. We note the four 
possible agreements with [D , D], [T , D], [D , T], and [T , T], where the first letter 
denotes the commitment of the first agent, and the second letter denotes the commitment 
of the second agent. We do not define the bargaining process itself but rather rely on the 
Nash axiomatic bargaining approach, treating the payoff associated with no-transaction, 
(1, 1), as the status quo. However, after the agreement was reached, both are able to 
choose whether to transact or not to transact regardless of the agreement (penalties for 9  
 
deviating from an agreement are introduced later). Agents are not aware of the history or 
the actions of other agents. 
  Nash equilibrium of the above game is obviously (D  ,  D). Since agents are 
unaware of the history of actions of other agents, there are no history-dependent 
strategies. Since there is no penalty for breaching the agreement, the agreement phase 
does not assist in executing the transaction, and regardless of the agreement the two 
agents reach, the transaction does not take place, and both agents end up with 1, rather 
than with r. 
2.2  Institutions, Trust and Integrity 
  Institutions are the first mechanism that can lead to a better result than (D , D). 
We define institutions in the sense of contract enforceability. Thus, effective institutions 
are institutions that enforce execution of the agreement reached prior to the attempted 
transaction  on both agents. Alternatively, institutions punish for deviating from an 
agreement such that the decrease in payoff due to the deviation is large enough to ensure 
that both agents follow the agreement. Thus, under effective institutions, the agreement 
would be executed, and rather than analyzing the above-mentioned strategic game the 
focus is on the preliminary phase of reaching the agreement.  
  Let us observe the four possible agreements, [D , D], [T , D], [D , T], and [T , T]. 
The first agent would not agree to [T , D], since by changing his own commitment to D 
his payoff increases. Similarly, the second agent would not agree to [D , T], and we are 
left with the possible agreements of [D , D] and [T , T]. Both agents know that if they do 
not agree to [T , T], the other agreement would lead to an inferior payoff (1 rather than r), 
and thus [T , T] is the reached agreement.
4 Formally, the bargaining regarding the 
agreement can be treated similarly to an axiomatic bargaining problem using the payoff 
associated with no-transaction, (1, 1), as the status quo, the outcome that occurs if 
bargaining breaks down. Similarly to the requirements of the Nash solution to the 
bargaining problem, Pareto Optimality rules out agreement [D , D], since both agents can 
increase their utility by agreeing to [T , T], and symmetry rules out [D , T] and [T , D]. 
Thus, [T , T] is the only possible solution to the bargaining problem. Alternatively, since 
we do not restrict the duration of the negotiations, one may treat reaching the contract as 
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an infinitely repeated game in which the agents choose the strategy to agree upon. In this 
type of game choosing T and switching to D in the rest of the periods if the other agent 
chooses D leads to (T , T), which means an agreement of [T , T].
5 Thus, good contract 
enforcing institutions lead to a result of (T , T) and to a payoff of r for each agent, rather 
than 1 each.  
  However, good institutions, formal or informal, are not always present. A possible 
substitute is trust, and although we focus on integrity, we present the option of trust, 
following Zak and Knack (2001), and show that our model is consistent with it. Zak and 
Knack (2001) presented a model of consumers that can save through brokers, the broker 
can cheat the consumer regarding the return, and the consumer can spend time verifying 
it. The population is socially heterogeneous, and when the social distance between the 
consumer and broker is smaller, verification is more efficient, i.e. the broker suffers more 
for cheating given the same verification time. Hence, in homogenous societies, less time 
is spent on verification, i.e. trust levels are higher. Trust is therefore dependent on a 
social arrangement that leads to more efficient verification among similar people.   
  We follow a simplified version of this mechanism, by defining trust as a social 
mechanism, in which in homogenous societies, an agent that deviates from an agreement 
and harms another agent is punished by the society.
6 Thus, we assume that in socially 
homogenous population, there is a decrease of e, e>c, in the utility of an agent deviating 
from an agreement if this deviation causes damage to the other side due to social 
punishment, but there is no penalty for deviating if it increases the utility of the other 
side. Thus, e captures the effect of the social arrangement among similar agents, their 
social ties etc., such that the members of the same social group punish the deviator. In 
socially heterogeneous societies, in which the social distance among the agents is larger 
and social ties are weaker, we assume that there is no such penalty. The payoff structure 
in homogenous society for every agreement is described in Figure II, where the bold text 
represents the Nash equilibrium for each agreement:  
 
                                                  
5 Notice the similarity to the infinitely repeated version of the prisoner's dilemma.  
6 Our definition is, therefore, similar to institutions. We present trust to show that the model is consistent 
with the relevant literature (see Zak and Knack, 2001), but our major contribution is the analysis of 
integrity.  11  
 
Figure II - Payoffs in Socially Homogenous Society* 
Agreement: [D , D]:     Agreement: [D , T]:  
  D T     D T 
D  1 , 1  r+c , 1-c   D 1 , 1-e  r+c , 1-c 
T  1-c , r+c  r , r   T 1-c , r+c-e  r , r 
          
Agreement: [T , D]:     Agreement: [T , T]:  
  D T     D T 
D  1-e , 1  r+c-e , 1-c   D 1-e , 1-e  r+c-e , 1-c 
T  1-c , r+c  r , r   T 1-c , r+c-e  r , r 
 
* The bold text represents the Nash equilibrium for each agreement.  
 
  For example, if both agents agree on [T , D] and agent 1 chooses D, his payoff 
decreases to 1-e or r+c-e (instead of than 1 or r+c), depending on the action of the other 
agent. Similar considerations as with institutions rule out the agreement of agent 1 to     
[T , D], which in the subsequent 'game' would yield 1-c, compared to 1 under the 
agreement of [D , D]. Agreement for [D , T] is ruled out using similar considerations for 
agent 2. Among the other two agreements, the agreement of [T , T] is preferred over      
[D , D] by both agents, and thus the payoff to each one of the agents is r. Formally, 
similar to institutions above, one can treat reaching the agreement as a Nash bargaining 
problem, or as a repeated game, in which the payoffs are the payoffs in the Nash 
equilibrium which follows that agreement. In the spirit of the requirements of the Nash 
bargaining solution, Pareto Optimality rules out agreement [D , D] and Symmetry rules 
out [D , T] and [T , D]. Hence, [T , T] is the only possible solution to the bargaining 
problem (for a repeated game, choosing T by both agents is a possible result of such a 
game). Thus, the social arrangement of punishing for deviations allows for trust, i.e. 
knowing that an agreement would be followed, and thus enables an agreement for 12  
 
transacting and execution of this agreement, similarly to good institutions. Obviously, in 
socially heterogeneous societies, where this punishment mechanism does not exist, 
regardless of the agreement the two agents reach, the transaction does not take place. 
Therefore, both agents end up with 1, rather than with r. Other mechanisms of social 
norms, in which an agent deviating from an agreement or contract is punished by a third 
party (see, for example, Greif 1993) can be modeled in a similar way. Thus, the model is 
consistent with the literature regarding the causes and effects of trust and with other 
social norms.  
  Both institutions and social norms such as trust require cooperation, i.e. 
participation of more than one agent in their formation, which is not always available. 
However, integrity (or honesty, which serves her as a synonym), a characteristic of an 
individual, can perform the same role without such cooperation. We define an honest 
agent as an agent that does not like to lie, i.e., suffers a decrease of d in her utility (d>c) 
whenever she commits to one action but performs another, regardless of whether the 
other side suffered a loss due to the deviation. A dishonest agent does not suffer from not 
carrying out his commitment. Hence, honesty is a personal characteristic (a moral trait). 
Note that we are not interested in the origin of this characteristic, nurture or nature, 
genetic, religious, induced by parents etc., but simply assume the existence of honesty or 
dishonesty in any given agent. Agents are unaware of the type of the agent they are 
matched with, but are aware of the share of each type in the population. The population is 
large, such that the type of a given agent does not affect the probabilities of being 
matched with each type. 
  We proceed with the analysis of an economy with no institutions and no trust. 
While proposition 1 is intuitive and proposition 2 is semi-intuitive as well, they serve as a 
basis for proposition 3 and especially for proposition 4, which provide a deeper 
understanding of the evolution of such economy over time. 
Proposition 1: Assume an economy with no institutions and no trust. If all the agents are 
honest, the outcome of every match is (T , T), and the utility to every individual is r. If all 
the agents are dishonest, the outcome of every match is (D , D), and the utility to every 
individual is 1. 13  
 
Proof: If all agents are honest, the payoffs and the Nash equilibrium for the possible 
agreements are described in Figure III below: 
 
Figure III - Payoffs with Integrity of Both Agents* 
Agreement: [D , D]:     Agreement: [D , T]:  
  D T     D T 
D  1 , 1  r+c , 1-c-d   D 1 , 1-d  r+c , 1-c 
T  1-c-d , r+c  r-d , r-d   T 1-c-d , r+c-d  r-d , r 
          
Agreement: [T , D]:     Agreement: [T , T]:  
  D T     D T 
D  1-d , 1  r+c-d , 1-c-d   D 1-d , 1-d  r+c-d , 1-c 
T  1-c , r+c  r , r-d   T 1-c , r+c-d  r , r 
 
* The bold text represents the Nash equilibrium for each agreement. 
 
  Similar to the argument for trust, agreements [D , T] and [T , D] are ruled out 
(note that the payoffs of the Nash equilbria of the two agreements are identical to the case 
of trust). [T , T] is preferred to [D , D], and thus [T , T] would be the reached agreement, 
and r is the payoff of each of the two honest agents.  
  If the two agents are dishonest, there is no loss of utility (d) due to any deviation 
from an agreement. Therefore, regardless of the reached agreement, the proceeding 
payoffs of the attempted transaction are those described in Figure I. Accordingly, 
similarly to the case of no institutions, the agreement is merely a 'cheap talk', the Nash 
equilibrium is (D , D) and the payoffs to both agents are 1.                    Q.E.D. 
  Note that the payoffs in a pure honest society are similar to those of a socially 
homogenous society, i.e., a society with trust, and that a pure dishonest society is similar 
to a socially heterogeneous society. The contribution of integrity in these cases is the 14  
 
motive behind the payoffs. However, a major contribution of integrity is the case of 
heterogeneous society with respect to values, which cannot be represented using social 
heterogeneity. 
Proposition 2: Assume an economy with no institutions and no trust. If the population is 
heterogeneous with respect to integrity, a dishonest agent obtains an equal or greater 
payoff than an honest agent, when they are matched with one another.   
Proof: Regardless of the agreement reached, a dishonest agent chooses D in the 
attempted transaction (as evident from Figure I, D is a strictly dominant strategy).  
  An honest agent chooses the strategy she agreed upon (as evident from Figure III, 
for every agreement, the payoffs of an honest agent that follows what she agreed upon are 
higher than if she does not follow the agreement, regardless of the action of the other 
agent). Denote the probability of encountering an honest agent with p. Since all the 
honest agents face the same probability of meeting another honest agent and the same 
payoffs schedule, their decisions are identical. If an honest agents find it optimal to agree 
on  T in the agreement phase,  and  she  encounters  another  honest  agent,  the  result  is          
(T , T), and her payoff is r. However, if she encounters a dishonest agent and chooses T, 
her payoff is 1-c (since the other agent chooses D). Thus, her expected payoff is 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( c p r p − × − + × .  
  If honest agents find it optimal to choose D, a match of an honest agent with 
another honest agent will result in (D , D) and payoffs of 1 for each agent. A match with 
a dishonest agent has an identical result. Thus, the payoff of an honest agent in this case 
is 1. Therefore, an honest agent would find it optimal to agree to transact (and therefore 
to transact) if and only if  1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ≥ − × − + × c p r p , i.e., if p and r are high enough.  
 Thus,  if  1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ≥ − × − + × c p r p , an honest agent agrees to T and actually 
chooses  T, and thus enjoys a payoff of r  or 1-c, when matched with an honest or 
dishonest agent, respectively. A dishonest agent, in this case, gets a payoff of r+c or 1, 
when matched with an honest or dishonest agent, respectively, i.e. a greater payoff than 
the honest agent. If 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( < − × − + × c p r p , honest agents agree on D and choose D, 
and thus everyone gets a payoff of 1.             Q.E.D. 15  
 
  Thus, when there are no institutions and trust, but all agents are honest, every 
match results in a transaction, while if all agents are dishonest, a match will end up with 
no transaction. In a heterogeneous economy with respect to integrity, if the probability of 
meeting an honest agent, p, is high enough (given the payoffs), a match that involves two 
honest agents will result in a transaction, but other matches will result in no transaction or 
one agent cheating the other. If the probability of meeting an honest agent is low, 
matches will end up with no transactions, similar to the economy of dishonest agents. 
2.3  A Single Period and the Evolution of the Economy over Time 
  There is one good in the economy that can be used as capital or for consumption 
purposes. Denote with  t K  the aggregate stock of capital at the beginning of period t. The 
capital is owned (separately) by the many different agents (honest and dishonest). Denote 
with 
H
t K the aggregate capital owned by honest agents in the beginning of period t and 
with 
D
t K  the aggregate capital owned by dishonest agents in period t. Throughout the 
period the agents are randomly matched with each other, and every match can engage in a 
single transaction of the type mentioned above, which involves one unit of capital from 
each side. The payoffs of a transaction are the output stemming from this capital. For 
example, in case an attempted transaction ends with (T , T) every unit of capital turns into 
r units (including the initial unit), while if the attempted transaction ends with (D , D), 
every unit of capital becomes 1 unit of output. An agent that owns k  units of capital 
would be matched k  times, such that all the units of capital would be able to engage in 
transactions. Accordingly, since every transaction requires 2 units of capital (one from 
each agent), there are t K /2 attempted transactions in the period. The payoffs from all the 
transactions are realized at the end of the period, followed by consumption. Every agent 
consumes a share 1-s  of the payoffs received and saves s of these payoffs for the 
following period, where 1 , 0 1 > > ≥ sr s . The saved payoffs serve as the capital for the 
subsequent period. 
  The agents are not aware of the type of agent (honest or dishonest) they are 
matched with, but are aware of the overall amount of agents from each type and the total 
capital owned by each type, and thus are aware of the probabilities of being matched with 
each type of agent. Accordingly, the probability of encountering an honest agent in 16  
 






t K K K p + = . We assume that there are many agents in the economy, 
such that the type of a certain agent does not affect p this agent faces. 
Proposition 3: Assume an economy with no institutions and no trust. If all the agents are 
honest, the growth rate of the capital stock is positive and equals  1 − sr . If all the agents 
are dishonest, the growth rate is negative and equals  1 − s . 
Proof: According to proposition 1, if all agents are honest, every match ends with a 
transaction, i.e., (T , T), and thus every unit of capital turns into r units of output. 
Therefore, a capital stock of  t K  becomes output of  t rK , out of which  t srK  units are 
saved for the next period, i.e.,  t t srK K = +1 . Therefore, the growth of the capital stock (and 
output) is  1 − sr , which is positive since  1 > sr .   
  According to proposition 1, if all agents are dishonest, every match ends with 
both sides choosing D, and thus the output from every unit of capital engaged in the 
attempted transaction is 1. Therefore, a capital stock of  t K  becomes output of  t K , out of 
which  t sK  units are saved, i.e.,  t t sK K = +1 . Therefore, the growth rate of the capital 
stock, and therefore of output, is negative ( 1 − s ).               Q.E.D. 
Proposition 4: Assume an economy with no institutions and no trust. If the population is 
heterogeneous with respect to integrity and the distribution of capital is such that honest 
agents choose to transact, the share of the capital owned by honest agents out of the total 
capital is decreasing over time, such that honest agents find it less profitable to agree on T 
and to transact over time. If the distribution of capital is such that honest agents choose 
not to transact, the growth rate of the output is negative and equals  1 − s . 







t t K K K p + = . As in proposition 2, honest agents agree on T and choose T if and 
only if the distribution of capital is such that  t p  is high enough to satisfy 
1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( > − × − + × c p r p t t . In this case, as in proposition 2, the average output out of 
one unit of capital held by an honest agent is  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( c p r p t t − × − + × , and since s of it is 




t − × − + × = + . As in proposition 2, the average output out 
of one unit of capital held by a dishonest agent is  1 ) 1 ( ) ( × − + + × p c r p , and since s of 17  
 




t p c r p sK K . Thus, by substituting 
D
t K 1 +  and 
H
t K 1 + , one 
can get  ) 1 ( )
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= , and therefore, as long as honest agents agree on 
T,  0 ⎯ ⎯ → ⎯ ∞ → t t p . Thus, both p and the payoff to honest agents,  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( c p r p − × − + × , 
decrease over time. Since  1 ) 1 ( < −c  and 1 > r , there exists  p ˆ  such that 
1 ) 1 ( ) ˆ 1 ( ˆ = − × − + × c p r p . Eventually  t p  decreases below  p ˆ , and honest agents prefer 
not to agree on T.  
 Once  t p  is below  p ˆ , honest agents agree on D in the agreement phase and do not 
transact. Dishonest agents do not transact as well, so that all transactions end up with     
(1 , 1). Therefore, the output from every unit of capital is 1, s out of it is saved for the 








t sK K = +1 , thus p is not changing over time from that period. Therefore, 
p remains below  p ˆ  for all the following periods, and no transactions would take place in 
the following periods.            Q.E.D.  
  Proposition 3 describes the growth paths of an economy with complete integrity, 
where all agents are honest, compared to the deterioration of an economy without 
integrity. Proposition 4 describes the deterioration in economic performance of a 
heterogeneous economy with respect to integrity. While in initial periods, transactions 
may occur and the capital and output may increase, since dishonest agents get higher 
payoffs and acquire capital, the probability of an honest agent to be matched with a 
dishonest agent is increasing over time, and eventually the honest agents would choose 
not to transact. From that point onwards, there are no transactions in the economy, and it 
follows the deterioration path of the economy without integrity. 
  Evolutionary game theory analyzes the stability of a certain group to the 
introduction of few mutants, where in some cases the mutants' payoff is higher and the 
mutants' population increases and takes over the rest of the population. As evident from 18  
 
proposition 4, a pure-honest economy is not stable for the introduction of a dishonest 
agent under the assumptions we have used. However, one should note that if the number 
of dishonest agents is very small, and the number and the identity of these agents are not 
changing over time but only their capital, the assumption that the other agents do not 
know who are the dishonest agents is no longer plausible. One may consider, for 
example, a single dishonest agent introduced to an honest economy. According to 
proposition 4 his capital is increasing over time relative to the capital of the other agents, 
eventually making the probability of encountering him high enough to deter from any 
transactions in the economy. However, since it is the same single agent in all the periods, 
it is reasonable to assume that eventually the other agents learn about his identity, cease 
transacting with him, but continue transacting with one another. Thus, by allowing for the 
exclusion of small groups that are not changing over time from the assumption of 
anonymity, the use of capital creates a certain stability of an honest economy. 
  One can easily incorporate labor into the model by introducing a total amount of 
time available for work every period, equally distributed among the agents. Agents are 
matched in a similar way to the above, investing either one unit of labor or one unit of 
capital in every transaction, the payoff structure is identical and the payoffs can be used 
for consumption or for savings as capital. Alternatively, a transaction may require both 
capital and labor. One can also introduce technological change (an increase in r over 
time) in a learning-by-doing style mechanism. The main results regarding the differences 
between an economy in which all agents are honest to an economy in which they are not 
are maintained, although the renewability of the labor resource over time creates a lower 
bound for the output of the latter economy.  
 
3.  Data and Empirical Analysis 
  This section provides empirical support for the effect of honesty and integrity 
over economic performance in economies that are heterogeneous with respect to 
integrity. As mentioned above, since integrity is a 'third line of defense' for the execution 
of transactions, empirical analysis of honesty and economic performance should focus 
either on cross-country analysis for countries in which institutions are weak and trust 
level is low, or on different ethnic, religious or other groups within a given country, in 19  
 
which institutions are weak and trust levels are low. We chose to focus on the latter, and 
constructed indicators for economic performance, trust and integrity for five religious 
groups in Lebanon, a country in which internal and external forces have weakened its 
institutions. Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2008) ranked Lebanon in the 30 percentile 
with respect to Rule of Law (which includes contract enforceability), with a score of -
0.66 on a scale of  -2.5 to 2.5. Since we found that trust levels are low (see below), which 
is consistent with the ethno-linguistic characteristic of the country, we can analyze the 
link between integrity and economic performance. We also support our theoretical 
findings with evidence from Kenya. 
  The main religious groups in Lebanon are Shiite Muslim, Sunni Muslim, 
Maronite Christian, other Christians and Druze. We grouped the Maronite Christians and 
the other Christians into one group (due to the inability to geographically distinguish 
between the two). We also separated the Shiite Muslims into two groups, due to 
geographic separation to two areas, the Southern part of Lebanon and the Beka, and 
different characteristics of the population in these areas. Thus, we have five different 
groups: Shiite Muslim (Beka), Shiite Muslim (South), Sunni Muslim, Christian and 
Druze.  
3.1 Economic  Performance 
  Religious identity is a sensitive issue in Lebanon; consequently, the government 
does not release data that directly identifies individuals’ religious associations or the 
economic conditions of members of various religious groups. However, there is a strong 
association between geographical location and religious groups, which we utilized in 
order to construct indices for the various groups. El-Khoury and Panizza (2005) provides 
data based on the 1996 Lebanese Population Housing Survey that include the shares of 
Druze, Muslim-Shiite, Muslim-Sunni, Maronite Christian and other Christians in the 
population for each of the 26 districts ('kadas'). We relied on their data to classify each of 
these districts to one of the religious groups mentioned above, based on the religion of the 
majority of the population, dropping any district in which there is no clear majority 
associated with a certain religious group. 
  Economic indices were extracted from the Demographic Characteristics and 
Socio-Economic Situation in Lebanon (2001), a report compiled from the Public Housing 20  
 
Survey of 1996, the Census of Building and Institutions 1996, and supplemental sources, 
by the Lebanese Ministry of Social Affairs in cooperation with United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP).  The report provides many indicators for each one of the 
districts, from which we focus on three categories: housing, education, and income 
related indicators. The data provided classified households into five groups with respect 
to these indicators, ranging from very low to very high, where ranking of very low and 
low level of satisfaction are considered “deprivation” levels of basic needs, and reports 
the percentage of the population in each district that falls in each of these levels of 
satisfaction.  
  We used the above mentioned data to compute indices of economic performance 
for each of the five identified religious groups. For every district and for every category 
(housing, education, and income), we calculated the percentage of population at 
deprivation level (by summing the share of low and very low). For every religious group, 
we averaged the shares of population in deprivation level, weighted by population, in the 
districts associated with that particular group. Thus, we calculated deprivation indices for 
each group for the three categories (the share of the population with dissatisfactory level 
of that category), representing economic performance of the group, such that a lower 
indicator represents better economic performance. See Table 1 for the districts of each 
group and the calculated indicators. 
 
Table 1 - Deprivation Indicators for Groups in Lebanon 
Group Districts  Housing  Education  Income 












Christian  El-Matn, Jbeil, Kesrouan, Bsharri, El-
Batroun, Zghorta, Jezzine, El-Koura 
20.6 25.7 30.5 
Druze Aley  19.7 23.1 35.4 
Muslim/Shiite (Beka)  Baalbak, Hermel  34.9 46.5 59.8 
Muslim/Shiite (South)  Tyre, Bint Jbeil, Marjeyoun, Nabatieh  29.4 44.0 57.7 
Muslim/Sunni  Akkar, El-Menie-Dennieh, Tripoli 
Sidon, Hasbaya 
33.3 47.8 54.9 
  
 
  One can easily notice the differences among the groups and the correlations 
across the indices. The indicators for all the Muslim groups are significantly higher than 21  
 
those of the Christians and Druze, representing a larger share of the population of the 
Muslim groups with unsatisfactory conditions, i.e. suffers from poorer economic 
performance. 
3.2 Values 
  Since stories reflect the values of the society (Johns-Heine and Gerth 1949; 
Albrecht 1956) and shape the values of the younger members of the society (Vitz 1990; 
Hakemulder 2000), following Aharonovitz and Kabura (2008), we have used children's 
stories to infer the values of each of the religious groups (see also McClelland 1961). We 
interviewed respondents from each of the five groups (by telephone), asking each 
responder to name and narrate popular children stories, thus collecting 126 popular 
stories.
7 Although we are interested only in integrity and trust, we used the stories to infer 
various other values that may affect economic performance, to allow for future use. A 
research assistant and two of the researchers evaluated each story with respect to twelve 
values (hard work, entrepreneurship, risk taking, collaboration, leading others, altruism, 
responsibility to other group members, law obedience, just reward, integrity, trust, and 
justice/morality), without knowing to which group the story belongs. Each story received 
a score for each value (i.e., twelve scores): -1 for opposing the value, 1 for some support, 
2 for strong support, and NA for not addressing the value, with a majority rule being used 
in case of differences in the evaluations. For each group, the indices for the twelve values 
were constructed as the average over the scores of these values for each of its stories. See 
Appendix 1 for a list of the questions used for scoring. 
  Out of the above mentioned values, leading others and law obedience were 
addressed in less than three stories for at least two of the groups, and thus are not 
reported. Justice/morality was addressed in only one story for one of the groups (Druze), 





                                                  
7 Since we were asking to name and narrate popular stories, a small sample in sufficient to identify 
representative stories.  22  
 

















Integrity Trust  Justice / 
morality
Christian 1.4  0.5  -0.3 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.6 0.9 0.3 2.0
Druze 1.3  -0.2  -0.3 0.3 0.6 1.0 0.6 -0.1 -0.4 -1.0
**
Muslim/Shiite 
(Beka)  1.2 0.3  -0.1 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.4 0.5 2.0
Muslim/Shiite 
(South)  1.5 0.0  -0.1 0.8 1.3 1.9 0.9 0.6 -0.6 1.7
Muslim/Sunni 1.3  -0.3  0.0 0.1 1.2 1.4 1.0 1.0 -0.5 2.0
*    2 - strong support; 1 – some support; 0 – no support; -1 opposing the value. 
**  Based on only one story. 
  
Trust levels are relatively low, with values of -0.6 to 0.5. Thus, trust cannot 
replace institutions, and we can focus on integrity. Integrity levels vary between -0.1 
(Druze) and 1.4 Muslim/Shiite (Beka), and their relation to economic performance will 
be presented in the next sub-section. Levels of justice/morality, which may be equivalent 
to integrity, vary from -1.0 (Druze) to 2.0, but the observation of -1.0 is based on only 
one story, while the remaining four observations provide very little variation. 
3.3 Correlations 
  We have calculated the correlations and found that the correlation of integrity 
with 'housing' is 0.75, with 'education' is 0.69 and with 'income' is 0.55. One can easily 
notice the positive correlation between integrity and all these deprivation indicators, i.e., 
being more honest is associated with poorer economic performance.  
  Causality between the indicators and integrity can run in only one direction. The 
economic performance indictors represent the conditions during the 1990s, while many of 
the stories used to measure integrity are much older. Since the stories and the inferred 
values predate the economic indicators, there is no endogeneity between the two, and 
causality can run from integrity to current economic performance, but economic 
performance cannot be causal to the any of the values.  
  Within a framework of a given country, internal trade and economic integration 
tend to be very high, compared, for example, to international trade (the border effect). 
Thus, we can expect many matches and attempted transaction among the different 23  
 
groups. Since integrity varies across the different groups, the economy fits propositions 2 
and 4 regarding a mixed economy. The correlations that were found are in line with 
proposition 2, since the groups with less integrity perform better than the groups with 
more integrity, i.e., groups with more dishonest people perform better since many of 
them manage to cheat people from other groups with higher levels of honesty. One may 
also consider it as simple interactions between the groups, leading to a similar result. 
Lebanon was once known as "Switzerland of the East". Although a civil war, that 
affected the economy significantly, ended at 1990, Lebanon finds it hard to recover and 
to return to its previous status, in-line with proposition 4 regarding the deterioration of a 
heterogeneous economy with respect to integrity. However, the proposition refers to 
long-term evolution; thus, many more years may be required in order to verify whether 
the economy indeed behaves in-line with the proposition. We refrain from regression 
analysis of Lebanon since we have only five observations, but present regression for 
Lebanon and Kenya together, see subsection 3.5.  
3.4  Evidence from Kenya 
  Aharonovitz and Kabura (2008) provides data regarding economic performance 
and values of seven tribes in Kenya. Out of this data, Table 3 provides the economic 
indicators constructed there, and the findings regarding integrity and trust. Notice that for 
all indicators besides infant mortality, higher indicator represents better economic 
performance. 
 












































Kalenjin         53.0          51.1          32.5          33.5          11.0          58.7   0.79 -1.00
Kamba         55.9          54.9          31.0          29.1            8.3          67.4   0.07 -0.83
Kikuyu         35.0          71.4          45.9          38.8          20.1          95.9   -0.47 -1.00
Kisii         61.2          58.0          27.9          21.5            4.4          69.8   -0.17 -0.89
Luhya       104.9          54.6          33.4          24.1            5.7          57.3   0.14 -0.70
Luo       125.8          52.9          40.8          23.8            8.4          54.3   0.08 -0.82
Meru          46.1          50.6          37.9          24.5          19.8          88.4   0.11 -0.88
*    2 - strong support; 1 – some support; 0 – no support; -1 opposing the value. 24  
 
 
  Institutions in Kenya are weak (according to Kaufmann et al. 2008, Kenya is in 
the 15.7 percentile for Rule of Law, with a score of -0.98 on a scale of  -2.5 to 2.5), thus 
we can focus on trust and integrity. One can easily notice the extremely low levels of 
trust, ranging from -0.7 to -1.0 (on a scale of -1.0 to 2.0), which is consistent with the 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization in Kenya. Integrity levels vary between -0.5 to 0.8, and 
therefore allow focusing on integrity and economic performance in a mixed economy, in 
accordance with proposition 2.  
  As before, our analysis focuses on correlations. The correlations between integrity 
and the two leading indicators in Aharonovitz and Kabura (2008), 'electricity, piped 
water and sewage' and 'house roof' are -0.23 and -0.61. Thus, similarly to the previous 
subsection, higher levels of integrity lead to poorer economic performance, as predicted 
by proposition 2. The correlations with the other indicators are in-line with this 
proposition as well: a correlation of 0.14 with 'infant mortality rate' (i.e., higher integrity 
is associated with higher mortality rate), -0.77 with 'education' (i.e., higher integrity is 
inversely associated with higher level of education), -0.42 with 'family size' (i.e., integrity 
is inversely associated with having a smaller family), and -0.05 with 'external 
employment'. Thus, all the correlations are in line with the proposition. As before, we are 
forced to refrain from regression analysis of Kenya since we have only seven 
observations, but present such an analysis for Lebanon and Kenya together. 
3.5 Regression  analysis 
  Due to the number of observations in each country (5 in Lebanon and 7 in 
Kenya), regression analysis for each country separately is not possible. However, using 
both countries would yield 12 observations, allowing for basic OLS regressions. One 
issue that requires attention is the consistency of the variables in both countries. While 
our index of integrity is consistent in both countries, our measurement of economic well 
being is not, since we measured education, housing and income deprivation in Lebanon 
(see table 1), compared to six different categories of well being in Kenya (see table 3). 
Accordingly, we converted the indicators for Lebanon to well-being indicators on a scale 
of 0-100, measuring the share of population above deprivation (i.e., 100 – (deprivation 
indicator)). For Kenya, all the indicators measured well being on a scale of 0-100, 25  
 
besides infant mortality, that was converted to the share on infants surviving (i.e.,  100 - 
(mortality rate)).  
We used these well-being indicators to construct 4 different well being indicators 
jointly for the two countries, that are later used in the regression analysis: (1) Housing 
well being, based on the housing indicator for the ethnic groups in Lebanon and the 
Electricity, Piped Water and Sewage and House Roof for the tribes in Kenya (which 
Aharonovitz and Kabura, 2008, find as the most appropriate well being indicator for 
tribes in Kenya). (2) Housing and education, based on Housing and Education indicators 
for Lebanon and the Electricity, Piped Water and Sewage, House Roof and Education 
indicators for Kenya. (3) All but mortality: based on all our available indicators for both 
countries, besides infant survival rate, which is strongly affected by foreign aid). And (4) 
All categories indicator, based on all our available indicators for each of the countries. A 
country dummy variable in the regression will solve the problem of ‘level’ difference 
between the groups in each of the countries due to the different sources for the indicators. 
According to proposition 2, since both countries are heterogeneous with respect to 
integrity, and lack proper institutions and trust, integrity of each group should negatively 
affect its economic well being. The estimated equation is, therefore, 
i i i i dummy country integrity being well economic ε γ β α + × + × + = , and we expect β  
to be negative. As mentioned above, we have 12 observations (5 ethnic groups from 
Lebanon and 7 from Kenya), and four potential indicators for economic well being. The 
country dummy (i.e., 1 for Kenya and 0 for Lebanon) was used to control for level 
difference among the two countries, due to the different sources for well being indicators 
and due to different macroeconomic conditions in the two countries. Table 4 presents the 
results. 
  Columns (1)-(4) presents the regressions for each of the indicators mentioned 
above. The adjusted R-square is relatively high (0.74-0.84). The Kenya dummy is 
negative in all the regressions (representing either lower levels of well being or indicators 
which are more demanding, thus reporting lower values for the same well being 
compared to Lebanon). Our coefficient of interest, measuring the effect of integrity, is 
negative and significant in all the regressions, ranging from -11.08 to -13.26, with a 
significance level of 10% in one regression and 5% in the rest. Increasing the index of 26  
 
integrity, which ranges from -1 to 2, by 1 unit, translates to a decline of the well being 
indicator by 11.08 - 13.26, confirming our prediction that in heterogeneous societies with 
respect to integrity, integrity negatively affects economic performance. 
 
Table 4 - OLS Regression for Economic Performance and Integrity  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 











Constant    81.15 77.37 71.16 70.69 
  (14.39)*** (16.00)*** (14.54)*** (14.96)*** 
Integrity  -11.73 -13.26 -11.71 -11.08 
  (2.05)*  (2.71)** (2.36)** (2.31)** 
Kenya  Dummy  -39.55 -30.47 -30.02 -37.45 
  (6.42)*** (5.77)*** (5.61)*** (7.25)*** 
Adjusted R square  0.80  0.75  0.74  0.84 
Numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the t-statistics.  
*, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
  We are aware that using 12 observations cannot serve as a proof, and therefore 
regard our result merely as some support for the theoretical conclusion. Furthermore, we 
are aware that the geographical segregation we relied upon to construct the economic 
performance data is incomplete, that having more surveys and stories would have 
improved our measurement of the values, and that many other variables should be 
included in the above regressions as controls (for example, savings rate in each ethnic 
group; however, both the unavailability of this data and the fact that we have only 12 
observations prevent us from including them). As for endogeneity, we iterate our claim 
from before, that the integrity variable is based on stories that generally predate the 
economic well being indicators, and therefore economic well being cannot affect our 
measurement of integrity. We hope to be able to extend our sample in the future, and thus 
to provide an empirical proof rather than some support.  
 
4. Discussion 
  This research investigates the importance of the individual’s values to the 
economic performance of the individual and the society. We have presented a model of a 
transactions-based economy with a possible contract prior to every transaction, in which 
transactions between individuals may lead to growth, but the lack of transactions may 27  
 
lead to stagnation or deterioration. We have introduced institutions, social norms leading 
to trust, and integrity into the model, showing that any one of the three can support better 
economic performance. We support one of the conclusions of the model, regarding the 
performance of agents in a heterogeneous economy with respect to integrity, by 
constructing data for economic performance, integrity and trust for religious groups in 
Lebanon, while avoiding problems of endogeneity among economic performance and 
values, and presenting regressions of economic performance as a function of integrity 
based on this data and similar data for ethnic groups in Kenya.   
  This transaction based micro-macro model has a potential for analysis of various 
aspects of institutions, social norms and values. As the nuclear transaction is intuitive on 
the one hand, but includes prior bargaining and contract, which make is realistic, on the 
other hand, it is easy to introduce the effects of all the above into this transaction. The 
introduction of capital into the model allows for aggregating over the transactions and 
analyzing their effect over the evolution of the entire economy. Another contribution of 
this paper is constructing data of economic performance for religious groups in Lebanon, 
which may allow for better understanding of the internal conflict there, as well as 
constructing data of various values of these groups, which support the methodology for 
inferring the values and may be used for further research.  
  The conclusion of the model regarding the successes of an economy with honest 
agents, and the possible deterioration of a heterogeneous economy (with respect to 
integrity) as well as the deterioration of an economy with only dishonest agents, 
economies in which many potential transactions are not executed, has important policy 
implications. In a less developed country with a high level of integrity, transactions and 
economic activity can occur without institutions. Aid can be directed at infrastructure, 
education etc., and succeed in promoting growth, while constructing proper institutions is 
less important. In less developed economies in which integrity and trust are absent, 
financing and building proper institutions, such as a strong law enforcement entity, may 
be required to support transactions. This policy may succeed in an economy with mixed 
agents, where proper incentives and screenings can ensure that the law enforcement 
entity would be comprised of honest agents. However, in a country with pure dishonest 
population, this policy would probably fail, since the law enforcement entity itself would 28  
 
be comprised of dishonest agents, and thus would be corrupted and would not ensure 
contract enforceability. Thus, countries with similar economic characteristics may require 
different development policies, based on the underlying values leading to the poor 
economic performance. 
  We acknowledge several limitations of the empirical part of the present study, 
including: (1) Having only five groups in Lebanon (and seven for Kenya), with different 
well being indicators in each country, weakens the empirical analysis; (2) The economic 
performance of the various groups is based on geographical segregation, which is not 
complete; and (3) We support the proposition regarding a mixed economy, but do not 
possess data to support the propositions regarding the extreme cases of complete honesty 
or complete dishonesty. However, we do believe that we provide some support for the 
theory, and a methodology for measurement of values to allow for further empirical 
analysis. We hope to be able to conduct a broader analysis for a large sample of 
countries. 
  The macroeconomic literature avoided treating values for a long time, probably 
due to the abstract nature of this topic and the lack of data. We hope that this research 
makes a step in making this analysis more concrete while providing relevant data, and 
thus supporting further research into the differences between growing and stagnating 








Value Identifying  Question
* 
Hard work  Does the story advocate hard work?  
Or – just the opposite (the story advocates being lazy) 
Entrepreneurship  Does the story promote entrepreneurship, initiating new activities etc.?  
Or - just the opposite (the story discourages entrepreneurship and new initiatives). 
Risk taking  Does the story encourage taking risks?  
Or - just the opposite (the story encourages avoiding risks). 
Collaboration   Does the story promote collaboration with others?  
Or - just the opposite (the story promotes individualism and working on one's 
own). 
Leading others  Does the story encourage leading others?  
Or - just the opposite (the story encourages avoiding being a leader). 
Altruism  Does the story advocate good will, altruism, helping others without 
receiving immediate benefit or preferring someone else's needs over one's 
own?  
Or - just the opposite (the story advocates selfish behavior or discourages 
altruism).  
Integrity  Does the story promote integrity, telling the truth and being honest in 
dealing with others?  
Or - just the opposite (the story promotes lying and being dishonest). 
Trust  Does the story encourage trusting others?  
Or - just the opposite (the story encourages suspicious and careful behavior 
towards others). 
Responsibility 
to other group 
members 
Does the story promote being responsible and caring to other group 
members, or doing what others are expecting us to do?  
Or - just the opposite (the story promotes rebelling in one's community or 
society). 
Law obedience  Does the story encourage obeying the law and respecting the rules?  
Or - just the opposite (the story encourages cheating, stealing or other unlawful 
behavior, semi-illegal or illegal activities). 
Just reward  Does the story advocate just reward - reward for good deeds or 
punishment for bad deeds?  
Or - just the opposite (the story shows that bad deeds may get a reward while 
good deeds may bring upon a punishment). 
Justice\morality  Does the story encourage justice and being just and moral?  
Or - just the opposite (the story encourages unjust behavior).  
 
*Answers included yes-definitely, yes-somewhat, no, just the opposite or N\A.30  
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